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a b s t r a c t 
The Internet has provided people with new ways of expressing not only their individuality but also their 
collectivity i.e., their group aﬃliations. These group identities are the shared sense of belonging to a 
group. Online contact with others who share the same group identity can lead to cooperation and, even, 
coordination of social action initiatives both online and oﬄine. Such social actions may be for the pur- 
poses of positive change, e.g., the Arab Spring in 2010, or disruptive, e.g., the England Riots in 2011. 
Stylometry and authorship attribution research has shown that it is possible to distinguish individuals 
based on their online language. In contrast, this work proposes and evaluates a model to analyse group 
identities online based on textual conversations amongst groups. We argue that textual features make it 
possible to automatically distinguish between different group identities and detect whether group iden- 
tities are salient (i.e., most prominent) in the context of a particular conversation. We show that the 
salience of group identities can be detected with 95% accuracy and group identities can be distinguished 
from others with 84% accuracy. We also identify the most relevant features that may enable mal-actors 
to manipulate the actions of online groups. This has major implications for tools and techniques to drive 
positive social actions online or safeguard society from disruptive initiatives. At the same time, it poses 
privacy challenges given the potential ability to persuade or dissuade large groups online to move from 
rhetoric to action. 
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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a  1. Introduction 
Global and national events over recent years have shown that
online social media can be a force for good (e.g., Arab Spring in
2010) and harm (e.g., the England Riots in 2011). In both of these
examples, social media played a key role in group formation and
organisation, and in the coordination of the group’s subsequent
collective actions (i.e., the move from rhetoric to action) ( Halliday,
2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012 ). Such coordinated actions are possi-
ble because individuals identify themselves with a particular social
group or with an ideal ( Taylor, Whittier, & Morris, 1992 ). Online
identity in such contexts is, therefore, not so much about the cat-
egorisation of the self as a singular “I”. Instead it is the conception
and expression of group aﬃliations as a more inclusive “we”. 
This paper focuses on these online group identities. Oﬄine
group identities are usually referred to as social identities by social
identity theory ( Deaux, 1996; Stryker & Burke, 20 0 0; Tajfel, 2010 ),∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: natalia.criado@kcl.ac.uk (N. Criado), a.rashid@lancaster.ac.uk 
(A. Rashid), larissa.leite@gmail.com (L. Leite). 
t  
(
 
a  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2016.06.023 
0957-4174/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.  social psychological theory that sets out to explain group pro-
esses, intergroup relationships and the social self. Social identity
s the individual’s explicit or implicit expression of belonging to
ertain social group, together with some emotional and value sig-
iﬁcance to him/her of the group membership ( Tajfel, 2010 ). Thus,
 person has not one “personal self” but rather multiple social
dentities that are culturally contingent and contextual ( Hankin,
013 ). The salient identity is the identity that comes into play
nd is invoked in a speciﬁc situation or context ( Stryker & Burke,
0 0 0 ). Thus, a social identity is salient when it is invoked across
 group of persons who perceive themselves as members of a so-
ial group. Which identity becomes salient in a given situation de-
ends on factors such as the level of commitment of a person to
 particular identity. One component of commitment is the num-
er of others with whom one is connected by possessing a partic-
lar identity. Thus, when a person shares a certain identity with
 greater number of people, his/her commitment to that identity
ends to be higher and this identity is likely to be more salient
 Stryker, 1980 ). 
Given the importance of online social media in orchestrating
nd coordinating large-scale group mobilisations —from democracy
N. Criado et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 62 (2016) 212–224 213 
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w  nd protest movements to hacktivist groups through to riots and
xtreme right wing marches— group identities are of key interest
o a variety of stakeholders. They can be: mobilised as a resource
or positive social change; studied to understand and counteract
rganised online actions that may compromise the safety and se-
urity of citizens; and even potentially be harnessed to build re-
ilience in individuals and groups to limit the harmful effects of
overnment or extremist efforts to disrupt online group formation
nd subsequent mobilisation. 
Of course, group identities are not the only variable that pre-
icts behaviour, but they can provide a guide to likely behaviours
as stated by social identity theory the higher the salience of
 social identity (i.e., the identiﬁcation with a particular group),
he greater the individual’s willingness to contribute to the social
ction ( Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2002; Stryker & Burke, 20 0 0 ). Social
dentities have been shown to inﬂuence behaviour in many do-
ains, including politics ( Jackson & Smith, 1999 ), protest move-
ents ( Reicher, 1996 ) and fan behaviour ( Platow et al., 1999 ).
nowing how salient is group identity can lead to predictions of
ow much the identity will inﬂuence the individuals’ beliefs, emo-
ions and actions. Since the activation of a social identity affects
he way people think as well as their feelings and behaviours,
ur hypothesis is that such group identities also affect the way
n which people communicate online. As such, our model char-
cterises text-based online communications in terms of a set of
extual features such as their language, their style and their in-
eraction patterns (i.e., the way in which users interact). We then
tudy the features that can best distinguish between different
roup identities online as well as those features that can indicate
he salience, or lack thereof, group identities. We address research
uestions categorised as follows: 
1. Detecting salience of group identities: 
(a) Do group identities manifest in online conversations, i.e., is
it possible to use textual features to automatically detect the
presence of salient group identities? 
(b) Is our analysis model generalizable to detect identity
salience across different group identities and on different
online social media? 
(c) Which features are most suitable for detecting identity
salience? 
2. Distinguishing group identities: 
(a) Is it possible to distinguish between different group identi-
ties on the basis of textual features automatically extracted
from conversations? 
(b) Is our analysis model generalizable to distinguish group
identities over time and on different online social media? 
(c) Which features enable a speciﬁc group identity to be accu-
rately predicted? 
ur evaluation shows that, by using a range of structural, gram-
atical, semantic, categorical and stylistic features, our model can
etect the salience of group identities with 95% accuracy and dis-
inguish between group identities with 84% accuracy. In general,
ur study reveals that there is much more valuable information
vailable on social media than just personal data. We identify fea-
ures of online conversations that can reveal important dynamics
f online groups and, hence, potential drivers for mobilisation of
uch groups. Notwithstanding the importance of protecting per-
onal data on online social media ( Anthonysamy, Greenwood, &
ashid, 2013; Madejski, Johnson, & Bellovin, 2011 ), it is also im-
ortant to study and understand how group identities are formed
nd could be exploited for positive or negative ends. While the for-
er has the potential to adversely affect individuals, the latter has
ajor implications for social action/inaction in our modern digital
ociety. 
The novel contributions of this paper are fourfold: 1. This is the ﬁrst paper to propose a model to analyse online
group identities based on social identity principles. 
2. We use textual features to detect group identity and its
salience. In contrast with other works that study the diﬃculties
people encounter when interacting with heterogeneous groups
in an online social network, e.g., ( DiMicco & Millen, 2007 ), or
how online identities are constructed and shaped, e.g. ( Zhao,
Grasmuck, & Martin, 2008 ), all the features analysed in our
model are extracted fully automatically, i.e., no human inter-
vention is required. 
3. We demonstrate that group identities and their salience man-
ifest themselves, with a high degree of accuracy, in text-based
online communications through a range of structural, grammat-
ical, semantic, categorical and stylistic features. 
4. Our results open up key privacy challenges for the research
community at large with regards to the potential exploitation of
group identities to persuade or dissuade large groups online to
move from rhetoric to action. We have implemented an online
tool that enables study of features underpinning online group
identities in order to investigate these challenges. We identify
which features can put online groups at most risk of such ma-
nipulation by mal-actors so as to build resilience against such
out-group inﬂuences. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 de-
cribes related work. Section 3 presents our model for analysing
roup identities including the features and the classiﬁers used
n the analysis. Section 4 describes experiments that validate of
ur model including the datasets used and the results obtained.
e discuss the implications of our model and experiments in
ection 5 . Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and identiﬁes di-
ections for future work. 
. Related work 
Within the Artiﬁcial Intelligence ﬁeld different computational
odels have been proposed to represent social identities. One of
he most cited models is the ABIR (Agent-Based Identity Reper-
oire) model ( Lustick, 20 0 0 ), which seeks to reﬁne, elaborate,
nd test theories of identity and identity shifts. This model has
een used in agent-based simulations to analyse the emergence
 Rousseau & Van Der Veen, 2005 ) and dynamics ( Smaldino, Pickett,
herman, & Schank, 2012 ) of social identities oﬄine. To the best of
ur knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst model for the automatic analysis
f group identities invoked on different online social media. 
There are empirical proposals, as ours, that draw conclusions
bout identity from information extracted from online social me-
ia. DiMicco and Millen ( DiMicco & Millen, 2007 ) describe a study
bout the way in which people present themselves (i.e., the way in
hich people invoke their identities) on Facebook. Speciﬁcally, the
uthors analysed Facebook proﬁles and interviewed employees be-
onging to the same company with the aim of understanding how
hey managed their identity when interacting with different social
roups (e.g., family, friends from school, workmates, etc.) on Face-
ook. The main contribution of their study was the identiﬁcation
f the diﬃculties that people encounter when interacting with het-
rogeneous groups using the same online social network; and the
dentiﬁcation of the need for more sophisticated controls that help
ne to manage one’s identities online. Similarly, Zhao et al. ( Zhao
t al., 2008 ) analysed Facebook proﬁles of students in a university
o study how these students presented themselves on Facebook.
hey focused on how the online identities of these persons were
built” on Facebook. An interesting conclusion of their study is that
dentities are usually claimed implicitly on Facebook (e.g., people
xpress that they belong to a group of friends by posting pictures
ith these friends instead of writing it in their self-description).
214 N. Criado et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 62 (2016) 212–224 
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E  Our model, on the other hand, explores group identities by fo-
cusing on automatically analysing the interactions among users in
which these identities are implicitly salient. 
In recent study, Conover et al. ( Conover et al., 2011 ) utilised
clustering and manual annotation of tweets to analyse the way
in which people with different political orientations (i.e., political
identities) communicate on Twitter. Speciﬁcally, they analysed the
retweets and mentions (which include replies) among users with
different political orientations. Their study shows that tweets are
usually retweeted by users who have a homogeneous political ori-
entation. In contrast, tweets are mentioned by users with a hetero-
geneous political orientation. 
In all the proposals aforementioned, the information is man-
ually analysed and processed by humans. However, there are
other proposals, like ours, in which the information is automat-
ically analysed and processed. Research in the ﬁeld of stylome-
try and authorship attribution has focused on automatically distin-
guishing between individuals online ( Narayanan et al., 2012; Sta-
matatos, 2009 ) as well as deception detection in online conversa-
tions ( Afroz, Brennan, & Greenstadt, 2012; Rashid et al., 2013 ). In
contrast, our approach focuses on analysis of group identities in-
stead of personal characteristics. 
Within the area of Social Networks a signiﬁcant amount of
work has been done to detect user communities or densely con-
nected subgroups of users in the network ( Girvan & Newman,
2002 ). In particular, several tools have been proposed to detect
communities automatically using unsupervised machine learning
algorithms ( Culotta, Bekkerman, & McCallum, 2004; Fogués, Such,
Espinosa, & Garcia-Fornes, 2014; Matsuo et al., 2007 ). Although
communities and group identities are not exactly the same con-
cept (e.g., the fact that users belong to the same domain in a net-
work does not entail that they feel as members of the same social
group), it might be argued that the same techniques used for com-
munity detection can be used for group identity analysis. However,
proposals on community detection assume that the social network
graph is known (i.e., the users and the relationships between users
are known), which makes possible the identiﬁcation of tightly knit
groups of users. However, this assumption is too strong for group
identity analysis because it is not necessarily true that all users
sharing a group identity are known. Similarly, user relationships
are likely to be unknown in this prediction problem. For example,
in many online social media, like Facebook, the information about
users’ friends is private and cannot be exploited to detect group
identities that are expressed explicitly (i.e., by means of friend-
ship relationships). This paper goes beyond these approaches by
using textual features to analysis group identities that are implic-
itly salient in online conversations. 
Recent research on Natural Language Processing is directing its
efforts towards analysing short text messages exchanged online
( Han & Baldwin, 2011 ). In particular, several authors have pro-
posed to combine machine learning and natural language process-
ing techniques to produce models that annotate short text mes-
sages with tags identifying speciﬁc themes or content ( Ramage,
Hall, Nallapati, & Manning, 2009 ). Note that these techniques can
be used to detect conversations corresponding to speciﬁc topics,
which could be used to perform group identity analysis. However,
the fact that a conversation is associated with a cohesive set of
topics does not necessary imply that the users share a common
social identity. For example, messages posted by users in a given
review site (e.g., TripAdvisor 1 ) may be associated with a reduced
set of topics according to the nature of the site (e.g., food, accom-
modation, attractions, etc.), but it is not necessarily true that these
users identify themselves as members of the same social group.1 http://www.tripadvisor.com 
d
 
〈  esides that, these models only allow messages to be annotated
ith a predeﬁned set of tags and, as a consequence, they will fail
o detect unforeseen topics that may be associated with emerg-
ng group identities. Our research also combines machine learning
ith different analysis techniques such as NLP, stylometry and in-
eraction analysis to produce a model speciﬁcally aimed at predict-
ng group identities. 
Verma et al. ( Verma et al., 2011 ) propose and evaluate a clas-
iﬁer to detect those tweets that contribute to “situational aware-
ess” in mass emergency. In ( Gupta & Kumaraguru, 2012 ) the au-
hors have built a linear regression model that takes as input text-
ontent based features to predict the credibility of tweets. Simi-
arly, in ( Ratkiewicz et al., 2011 ) a web service is presented that
utomatically detects astroturﬁng (i.e., campaigns coming from dis-
nterested, grassroots participants that are in reality carried out by
 single person or organisation) in Twitter. In a more recent work,
heng et al. ( Cheng, Romero, Meeder, & Kleinberg, 2011 ) analyse
he structural properties of social networks to predict reciprocity
f communication among Twitter users. Similar to our approach,
hese proposals illustrate the potential information that can be
leaned by automatic analysis of online social media interactions. 
In a recent proposal, Charitonidis et al. ( Charitonidis, Rashid,
 Taylor, 2015 ) analysed online communications to study oﬄine
roup action processes. In particular, this work analysed different
witter conversations for a speciﬁc event to identify weak sig-
als that could be used to predict oﬄine group actions. These re-
ults evidence that there are such early indicators of group ac-
ions in online communication. Based on these ﬁndings, our paper
roposes a novel model to predict the salience of group identi-
ies in online conversations. In particular, our work complements
nd extends this research by allowing the automated detection
nd identiﬁcation of group identities belonging to different do-
ains and online media; as opposed to the work of Charitonidis
t al. ( Charitonidis et al., 2015 ) which analyses Twitter conversa-
ions corresponding to a speciﬁc event and does not propose a
eneral predictive model. 
. Group identity model 
In this section we present a formal description of the model
sed for analysing group identities. The aims of our model are
wofold. Firstly, we aim to determine if we can automatically detect
he existence of salient group identities in text-based online com-
unications. Such automatic detection of identity salience would
llow the detection of incipient and unforeseen group identities
hat might lead to social action —as mentioned earlier, several
orks on social identity theory have noted the potential causal
elationship between the salience of a social identity and social
ction ( Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2002; Stryker & Burke, 20 0 0 ). Sec-
ndly, we aim to determine if we can automatically distinguish be-
ween different group identities in text-based online communica-
ions. This would enable automatic classiﬁcation of interactions ac-
ording to group identities of interest; e.g., group identities that
ay be considered as dangerous or beneﬁcial. 
.1. Model overview 
In our model each user u corresponds to an individual. We de-
ote by U the set of users that communicate online. We also as-
ume that there is a distinguished set I of group identities that
orrespond to social groups (e.g., supporter of Manchester United).
ach user may belong to different social groups (i.e., s/he may have
ifferent group identities). 
The information exchanged among users is formalised as tuples
 s, R, c 〉 ; where s ∈ U is the sender, R ⊆ U is the set of receivers,
N. Criado et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 62 (2016) 212–224 215 
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 nd c is the message content. In this paper we only consider text-
ased messages. Thus, the content of a message c consists of an
rdered set of words { w 1 , . . . , w n } , and a set of terms { d 1 , ..., d k }
ontaining metadata. 
In each message, the sender user can invoke one or more
roup identities. We deﬁne a function invoked that maps each mes-
age with the group identities that are invoked in it; i.e., given
 message 〈 s, R, c 〉 , the identities invoked in it are deﬁned as
n v oked(〈 s, R, c〉 ) ⊆ I . 
Group identities are culturally contingent and contextual and,
herefore, invoked in speciﬁc contexts or situations ( Hankin, 2013 ).
n online textual communication, a message sent by one user is
sually replied by other users and the context or situation in which
roup identities are invoked is formed by related messages. In par-
icular, we deﬁne a set of related messages (i.e., a message and its
eplies) as a conversation. More formally, we deﬁne a conversation
s a set of ordered messages { m 1 , ..., m n } where each message m i 
s deﬁned as a tuple 〈 s i , R i , c i 〉 . In a conversation, the ﬁrst mes-
age ( m 1 ) is a conversation initiation message, i.e., the message
hat started the conversation; and the rest of the messages ({ m 2 ,
.., m n }) are replies to this message. 
As aforementioned, one of the key factors that make it more
ikely that a group identity is salient is the connectedness among
ersons who possess this particular group identity. Thus, when a
erson interacts with others by invoking a group identity and the
thers conﬁrm this identity, then the salience of this identity is re-
nforced ( Stryker & Burke, 20 0 0 ). In fact, we hypothesise that this
s one of the main reasons for the formation of online communi-
ies, to create situations in which group identities can be expressed
nd conﬁrmed. The salient group identities in a conversation are
he group identities that are invoked repeatedly across the mes-
ages in a conversation. More formally, we deﬁne the group iden-
ities that are salient in a conversation as: 
alient({ m 1 , . . . , m n } ) = 
{ q } ⋂ 
in v oked(m i ) 
here q ∈ N such that q < n and ⋂ { q } is the relaxed intersection
f sets, which corresponds to the classical intersection between
ets except that it is allowed to relax q sets in order to avoid an
mpty intersection. Thus, the salient group identities is the set
f all group identities that are invoked across all the messages
 invoked ( m i )), except q messages at most. Note that the relaxed
ntersection makes it possible to make a robust identiﬁcation of
alient identities in a conversation with respect to some outlier
essages that invoke identities that are not predominant in the
onversation. 
When a conversation involves users who share the same group
dentity and are aware of it, it is highly probable that this group
dentity is invoked across most of the messages. 2 In contrast, when
 conversation involves users who do not share a group identity or
ho are not aware of this fact, then it is highly probable that the
essages in the conversation invoke disparate identities and, as a
onsequence, the salient group identity is the empty set. Accord-
ngly, we deﬁne salience as a function that determines if a group
dentity is salient in a conversation as follows: 
alience ({ m 1 , . . . , m n } ) = 
{
T rue if salient({ m 1 , . . . , m n } )  = ∅ 
F alse otherwise 
2 Note that it is also probable that a small proportion of the messages in a con- 
ersation are sent by users who belong to an opposite group and want to confront 
he users sharing the salient group identity, which, in turn, reinforces the salience 
f this group identity ( Reicher, 1996 ). 
 
 
 
a  
l  .2. Features analysed 
We use linguistic and structural features of conversations to
redict the values of the salient and salience functions. In partic-
lar, we analyse ﬁve feature sets that can be extracted from online
onversations. These feature sets are further classiﬁed into three
ain categories: (i) online interaction patterns, (ii) natural lan-
uage features, and (iii) stylistic metrics. 
Online interaction patterns . This category includes features that
an be extracted by analysing structural metrics of an online con-
ersation: 
Structural feature set. This set is formed by 3 numeric fea-
tures: (i) the number of messages contained in a conver-
sation; (ii) the participation-level of users, i.e., the ratio of
users to the number of messages; and (iii) the average inﬂu-
ence of messages; deﬁned as the average number of likes or
retweeted count of messages. 
Natural language features . This category includes features that
an be extracted by applying natural language processing tech-
iques to the text of the messages contained in the conversations.
peciﬁcally, we make use of the techniques proposed by Rayson
n ( Rayson, 2008 ) to extract natural language features, since these
echniques have been successfully used to analyse online conver-
ations extracted from Peer-2-Peer networks ( Hughes et al., 2008 )
r Twitter ( Ferrario et al., 2012 ). These features are grouped into
hree feature sets: 
POS feature set. This set is formed by numeric features that
represent the relative frequency of basic parts-of-speech
(POS) in the messages contained in conversations. Examples
of such features include relative frequency of articles, adjec-
tives, nouns, etc. To carry out the POS tagging, we use the
CLAWS ( Garside, 1987 ) tagger, which considers a tagset with
138 POS tags. 
Semantic feature set. This set is formed by numeric features
that represent the relative frequency of semantic tags in the
messages contained in conversations. Examples of such se-
mantic features include the relative frequency of text clas-
siﬁed as “geographical names” or text pertaining to “groups
and aﬃliations”, etc. To carry out the semantic tagging, we
use the USAS ( Wilson & Rayson, 1993 ) system that considers
a tagset with 452 semantic tags. 
Category feature set. This set is formed by numeric features
that represent the relative frequency of 36 categories or key
concepts that may manifest in a conversation. These key cat-
egories are obtained by applying the keywords methodol-
ogy (i.e., applying the keyness calculation to word frequency
lists) to extract key domain concepts (i.e., applying the key-
ness calculation to semantic tag frequency lists). Examples
of such features include relative frequency of categories such
as sports, politics, etc. To identify categories in conversations
we make use of Rayson’s approach ( Rayson, 2008 ). 
Stylistic metrics . This category includes stylistic features that can
e extracted by tools and methods from the ﬁeld of authorship at-
ribution ( Stamatatos, 2009 ). Speciﬁcally, we use the stylistic met-
ics proposed in ( Rashid et al., 2013 ), which have been used de-
ecting masquerading behaviour online: 
Style feature set. This set is formed by 22 numeric features.
Examples include: the average length of messages in terms
of words and characters, the frequency of emoticons, and the
vocabulary richness. 
Note that our feature sets only include features that can be
nalysed considering the information that is publicly available on-
ine. Other features such as demographic information about the
216 N. Criado et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 62 (2016) 212–224 
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4 http://www.mumsnet.com 
5 Recall that social identities have been shown to relate to behaviour in these 
domains ( Jackson & Smith, 1999; Platow et al., 1999; Reicher, 1996 ). users interacting in conversations may be private and cannot be
exploited to predict group identities. 
3.3. Classiﬁers used 
The features above are used to predict group identities in con-
versations. Speciﬁcally, the analysis is aimed to detect salient group
identities and to identify group identities. To this aim we have
built two types of classiﬁers: 
• Detection classiﬁers, which classify conversations into two cat-
egories: identity salience , and no salience . A conversation ( c ) be-
longs to the category identity salience when there is a group
identity that is salient in the conversation (i.e., when salience ( c )
is True ); and to the category no salience otherwise. 
• Identiﬁcation classiﬁers, which classify conversations into a ﬁ-
nite set of categories corresponding to the group identities that
are salient in the conversations. More formally, given a conver-
sation ( c ) an identiﬁcation classiﬁer tries to predict the value of
the salient function for this conversation ( salient ( c )). 
We have implemented each type of classiﬁer using two dif-
ferent algorithms: a J48 classiﬁer and a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classiﬁer, using the implementations in the Weka 3 data-
mining tool. These two classiﬁers have demonstrated a good per-
formance on classiﬁcation tasks with textual data ( Afroz et al.,
2012; Burgoon, Blair, Qin, & Nunamaker Jr, 2003 ). To train these
classiﬁers we annotate each conversation in our dataset with its
class and the values of the different features analysed. This leads to
ﬁve training sets, one per feature set —in each training set conver-
sations are annotated with their class and the values of one feature
set. 
3.4. Tool 
We have implemented our model in a tool, Identi-scope , that
makes these classiﬁers and the underlying feature extraction tools
available as a workﬂow to support studies of group identities and
the potential that may come from harnessing a deeper under-
standing of the processes that underpin such identities. The tool
enables users to study features underpinning identities of groups
that make their conversations available publicly. At the same time,
users can point the tool to their private conversations to under-
stand the various group identities they inhabit online and the fea-
tures that underpin those identities. The analysis can be conducted
over different time periods in the same conversation to study
ﬂuctuations of social identities in response to particular stimuli,
for instance, when key features underpinning social identities are
changed. However, we note that, due to ethical reasons, we have
not introduced such stimuli into any conversations in order to
study such ﬂuctuations. They can be a useful tool for users or
groups to study how their activities online may be inﬂuenced by
actors aiming to persuade or dissuade them from speciﬁc actions. 
4. Evaluation 
4.1. Datasets used in evaluation 
To evaluate our analysis model we collected text-based datasets
from Facebook and Twitter. According to our model, we refer to
each post, comment or tweet as a message . Thus, the content of
the message is formed by textual content and the metadata con-
tains information about the message inﬂuence (i.e., the number of
likes in case of posts and comments, and the retweet count in case3 www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
ﬂ
gf tweets). Finally, the term conversation refers to a collection that
ncludes: a text-based message (i.e., a tweet or post) and other re-
ated text-based messages (i.e., replies or comments). 
.1.1. Facebook datasets 
All the information collected was publicly available on Facebook
n two different periods: (i) between 18th February 2013 and 20th
pril 2013; and (ii) between 12th May 2014 and 12th June 2014.
or simplicity, we will refer to these collection periods as ﬁrst and
econd, respectively. 
Recent work on social psychology ( Levine & Koschate, 2014 ) has
emonstrated that the Internet provides users with online spaces
or expressing their social identities. Their study on Mumsnet , 4 a
ebsite for parents that hosts discussion forums focused on differ-
nt topics (e.g., mums, feminism), demonstrates that different fo-
ums represent different social identities (i.e., feminist forums rep-
esent the feminist social identity) and that the individuals change
heir writing style to adapt towards the group norm when a social
dentity is salient (e.g., when they post on the feminist forums). In
ccordance with these results, we collected information from the
acebook pages of protest groups, sports teams and personalities to
btain information about conversations in which group identities
re salient. 5 Speciﬁcally, we collected conversations posted during
ur two collection periods from the Facebook pages of Anonymous,
arack Obama, Beyoncé, Lady Gaga and Manchester United. These
ages are means to achieve or maintain positive a public image
nd to build a social group around a given protest group, sports
eam or personality. Supporters in turn use these pages to express
heir affection and support and to communicate with other fans.
ost of these messages invoke the group identity of being a sup-
orter of a particular person, sports team, or protest group. Besides
hat, users who belong to opposition groups can occasionally post
essages in these pages to confront the salient group identity. As
ighlighted by social identity theory ( Reicher, 1996 ), these oppo-
ition messages reinforce the salient group identity even further. 6 
hus, we assume that the impact of outlier messages (i.e., mes-
ages invoking disparate group identities) in these conversations is
egligible and that all conversations belong to the identity salient
lass. For example, we have collected posts and comments from
he Facebook page of Manchester United Football Club. This page is
sed by someone on his behalf of Manchester United to post infor-
ation about its activities. Besides, this page is used by thousands
f users (mainly Manchester United supporters) who comment on
he posts. These users hold a common identity (being a Manch-
ster United supporter) and view themselves as members of the
ame social group. For example, one of the messages in our dataset
osted by someone on behalf of Manchester United contains the
ollowing text “Rafael wins your Man of the Match vote for his fan-
astic display at both ends vs. QPR. Well done Rafael!”. Among the
essages sent in response to this post we can ﬁnd messages like
Oh! He deserves it”, “What goal Rafael !!!”, and “Yeah,congrats to
afael. And hope best for you”. 
To obtain information about conversations in which group iden-
ities are unlikely to be salient, we focused on those situations in
hich a person interacts with others on sites where heterogeneous
nformation is published neutrally; i.e., in pages that do not try
o create a social group around a protest movement, personality
r sports team. In particular, we obtained a dataset where iden-
ity salience is necessarily diluted by collecting a large number of6 Social identities become more salient in situations where a social group con- 
icts with a relevant opposition group (e.g., when the ideas or interests of opposite 
roups clash) ( Reicher, 1996 ). 
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Table 1 
Facebook pages included in our study. 
Page Collection Inﬂuence Importance 
Period 
Anonymous First 1025210 19635 
Second 1746674 24657 
Barack Obama First 35303430 1211796 
Second 41005573 879450 
Beyoncé First 43985350 424706 
BBC World News First 2950463 74426 
Lady Gaga First 55962915 210843 
Second 66155029 2029189 
Manchester United First 32299914 1356171 
Second 50249810 1628006 
MTV First 43297624 521441 
NBC News First 737559 76122 
YouTube First 71981268 464301 
Inﬂuence = Likes Count 
Importance = Talking About Count 
Table 2 
Facebook dataset (First collection period). 
Page C M U W 
Anonymous 6 1650 1410 45086 
Barack Obama 142 94010 67419 4628148 
Beyoncé 10 2946 2510 172923 
BBC World News 612 52841 46044 1589676 
Lady Gaga 4 1640 1304 21724 
Manchester United 246 88434 77600 1547141 
MTV 152 20765 19601 382797 
NBC News 271 55616 44016 1314677 
YouTube 33 1983 1938 24021 
C = conversations, M = messages, U = Users, W = words 
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Table 3 
Facebook dataset (Second collection period). 
Page C M U W 
Anonymous 4 452 410 11633 
Barack Obama 7 3710 2902 143901 
Lady Gaga 5 998 987 18260 
Manchester United 39 8695 8446 190219 
C = conversations, M = messages, U = Users, W = words 
Table 4 
Proﬁles included in our study. 
Proﬁle Inﬂuence Importance 
Anonymous 911130 10334 
Justin Bieber 36299641 548920 
Barack Obama 28587127 189859 
Lady Gaga 35229893 243017 
Manchester United 538129 2265 
MTV 7621274 25589 
Inﬂuence = Followers Count 
Importance = Listed Count 
Table 5 
Twitter API dataset. 
Proﬁle C M U W 
Anonymous 201 824 714 12598 
Barack Obama 219 2379 1529 41945 
Justin Bieber 295 3289 2700 35870 
Lady Gaga 5 64 47 894 
Manchester United 730 1875 1814 30242 
MTV 642 2122 1925 30481 
C = conversations, M = messages, U = Users, W = words 
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7 http://topsy.com/ onversations focused on varied topics and formed by messages
ith different tones. In such conversations, the social structures
upporting the salience of group identities dissolve ( Burke & Stets,
999 ), which leads to users invoking disparate identities. For exam-
le, we have collected posts from news pages that aim to cover all
ocial, political and other events fairly and impartially. Users read-
ng and commenting on these news pages may have several group
dentities but the fact that they cannot warranty that a particu-
ar identity is shared by other users on the news pages makes the
evel of commitment to a particular group identity low and sev-
ral group identities are likely to be invoked. Thus, we use these
onversations as samples belonging to the no salience class. Specif-
cally, we collected all the posts and comments made during the
rst collection period from the Facebook pages of BBC World News,
TV, NBC News and YouTube. 
We collected information from these sources for three rea-
ons. Firstly, they are highly inﬂuential and important (see
able 1 ). We deﬁne inﬂuence as the power to have an effect on
ther users. Accordingly, we deﬁne that a Facebook page is in-
uential when many people like it. Thus, we consider the likes
ount as an inﬂuence measure. We deﬁne importance as the
ctual manifestation of effect on other users. Accordingly, we de-
ne that a Facebook page is important when many people men-
ion it. Thus, we consider the talking about count as an importance
easure. Secondly, these sources are frequently updated and com-
ented on and, as a consequence, they contain a lot of information
see Tables 2 and 3 ). Finally, they cover different types of content,
uch as sports, politics, news, and so on. 
.1.2. Twitter datasets 
Twitter API dataset . This dataset contains tweets publicly avail-
ble on Twitter between 18 February 2013 and 20 April 2013 that
ave been collected using the Twitter public API. Similar to our approach to the Facebook dataset, to obtain infor-
ation about conversations in which a group identity is salient, we
ollected all the conversations from the Twitter proﬁles of Anony-
ous, Justin Bieber, Barack Obama, Lady Gaga and Manchester
nited. To obtain information about conversations in which group
dentities are unlikely to be salient, we collected tweets and replies
rom the Twitter proﬁle of MTV. 
We collected information from these sources because (see
ables 4 and 5 ): they are highly inﬂuential, important, contain lots
f information and cover different types of content. We deﬁne that
 Twitter proﬁle is inﬂuential when many people follow it —i.e.,
ollowers count. Similarly, we deﬁne that a Twitter proﬁle is impor-
ant when many people list it —i.e., listed count (a list is a curated
roup of users). 
2011 England Riots Dataset . This dataset contains the tweets ex-
hanged during the 2011 England Riots. The riots are also called
BlackBerry riots” because people used mobile devices and social
edia to organise them ( Halliday, 2011 ). Thus, this dataset con-
ains real tweets exchanged during group identity formation pro-
esses, group identity invocation and social action coordination.
peciﬁcally, the disturbances reﬂected in our dataset began on Sat-
rday 6 August 2011, after a protest in Tottenham following the
eath of Mark Duggan, a local who was shot dead by police on
hursday 4 August 2011. In the following days the riots spread
cross other parts of London and other cities in England including
irmingham, Bristol, and Manchester. 
To collect this dataset, we have used Topsy, 7 which is a search
ngine for social posts and socially shared content, primarily on
witter. The results provided by this search engine are not organ-
sed following a conversation pattern (i.e., an initiating tweet and
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Table 6 
Twitter England riots dataset. 
Set C M U W 
TottenhamPreRiots 29 3467 3151 60875 
TottenhamRiots 29 4244 4203 63189 
LondonRiots 29 4706 4699 73175 
C = conversations, M = messages, U = Users, W = words 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Identity salience detection when different feature sets 
are used to train the classiﬁers. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy(%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 98 .94 0 .98 
SVM 89 .71 0 .86 
POS J48 96 .98 0 .96 
SVM 98 .61 0 .98 
Semantic J48 97 .31 0 .98 
SVM 97 .96 0 .97 
Category J48 96 .73 0 .97 
SVM 94 .37 0 .9 
Style J48 89 .06 0 .9 
SVM 81 .71 0 .68 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Identy Salience No Salience
Fig. 1. ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem with the 
J48 classiﬁer and the structural feature set. 
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8 To dismiss overﬁtting problems we also repeated this experiment using cross- 
validation, which is a well-known technique to avoid overﬁtting, with different 
numbers of folders and we obtained very similar results. its replies). Thus, we approximated the conversations by grouping
the tweets according to the time when they were exchanged (e.g.,
consecutive tweets belong to the same conversation). Speciﬁcally,
we have selected a subset of the tweets corresponding to the riots
in Tottenham and London as follows: 
1. TottenhamPreRiots . This set contains tweets that match the
query #tottenham OR tottenham and were exchanged on
4 Aug. 2011. At that point in time, the riots had not started in
Tottenham and we assume that tweets invoke disparate iden-
tities and that conversations belong to the no salience class. In
fact, during this period of time, the number of tweets matching
this query per hour was lower than 500. Among these tweets
we can ﬁnd messages like: “has delighted the board of Totten-
ham Hotspur by winning the Premier Division” and “So we just
got to tottenham hale & realised we left our money at home.
Doh! Back we go”. 
2. TottenhamRiots . This set contains tweets that match the query
#tottenham OR tottenham and were sent on the 6 Aug.
2011. At that point in time, riots were very prominent in Tot-
tenham and, as mentioned above, Twitter and other social net-
works were used to coordinate social action. Indeed, during this
period of time the number of tweets matching this query per
hour was higher than 140 0 0. Thus, we assume that group iden-
tities are salient in these conversations. Among these tweets we
can ﬁnd messages like: “It’s not just #tottenham. #MetPolice =
corrupt dishonest + unaccountable ie rotten to the core” and
“I’m proud of tottenham right now”. 
3. LondonRiots . This set contains tweets that match the query
#londonriots OR (#london AND riots) and were sent
on 8 Aug. 2011. At this point, the riots were very prominent in
London and the number of tweets matching this query per hour
was > 60,0 0 0 (compared to < 2500 on the previous day). Thus,
we assume that group identities are salient in these conversa-
tions. Among these tweets we can ﬁnd messages like: “A riot
is the language of the unheard - Martin Luther King. #london-
riots” and “What army do we have to bring in - the majority
of them are being used as target practice by the Taliban...!!!
#londonriots”. 
Note the queries used for selecting the different datasets have
been previously used to identify weak signals of real-world mobil-
isations in ( Charitonidis et al., 2015 ). 
Table 6 shows the number of conversations, messages, users
and words contained in the riots sets. 
4.2. Detecting salience of group identities 
4.2.1. Do group identities manifest in online conversations, i.e., is it 
possible to automatically detect the presence of salient group 
identities online? 
Our ﬁrst research question is related to the detection of the
existence of salient group identities in online conversations. To
answer this question, we used the conversations extracted dur-
ing the ﬁrst collection period from the pages of Anonymous,
Barack Obama, and Manchester United as examples of conversa-
tions where there are salient group identities. We used the conver-
sations collected during the ﬁrst collection period from the pagesf BBC World News, NBC News and YouTube, as examples of con-
ersations where there is no apparent salient identity shared by
he users. We trained the J48 and SVM detection classiﬁers with the
onversations annotated with each feature set. To assess the ac-
uracy of these classiﬁers we used leave-one-out cross-validation
using a single conversation from the set as the validation data,
nd the remaining conversations as the training data; this was re-
eated such that each conversation in the dataset was used once
s the validation data. 
Table 7 shows the results obtained by each classiﬁer when
he structural features, POS features, semantic features, category
eatures and style features are considered. Speciﬁcally, this table
hows the accuracy, which is the percentage of correctly classiﬁed
onversations; and the weighted (by class size) area under the ROC
urve. Accuracy provides an understandable measure for classiﬁer
erformance. However, accuracy must be interpreted with caution
hen classes in the dataset are unbalanced (as occurs in our exper-
ments). In this situation, the area under the ROC curve is a more
obust performance measure ( Metz, 1978 ). According to guidelines
or the interpretation of the area under the ROC curve, excellent
lassiﬁers obtain areas under the ROC curve within the interval
0.9, 1], good classiﬁers (0.8, 0.9], fair classiﬁers (0.7, 0.8], poor
lassiﬁers (0.6, 0.7], and fail classiﬁers obtain areas lower or equal
o 0.6. 
From the results in Table 7 , we can determine that it is possible
o detect the presence of salient group identities in online conver-
ations with a high degree of accuracy —an accuracy of 98.94% is
btained with the J48 classiﬁer and the structural feature set. Fig. 1
hows the ROC curves obtained by this classiﬁer. 8 However, all the
eature sets, with the exception of style features, allow the detec-
ion of identity salience with a high degree of accuracy, i.e., there
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Table 8 
Identity salience detection: Facebook generalization. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy(%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 75 .3 0 .74 
SVM 84 .34 0 .62 
POS J48 69 .28 0 .71 
SVM 66 .27 0 .82 
Semantic J48 83 .13 0 .91 
SVM 92 .17 0 .89 
Category J48 65 .06 0 .58 
SVM 46 .39 0 .61 
Style J48 89 .76 0 .93 
SVM 96 .99 0 .82 
250 Features J48 70 .48 0 .79 
SVM 89 .16 0 .94 
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Fig. 2. ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem when con- 
versations from other Facebook pages are used to test the SVM classiﬁer trained 
with the most relevant feature set. 
Table 9 
Identity salience detection: Twitter generalization. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy (%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 94 .73 0 .96 
SVM 73 .89 0 .73 
POS J48 80 .15 0 .82 
SVM 85 .58 0 .85 
Semantic J48 81 .55 0 .83 
SVM 85 .17 0 .85 
Category J48 75 .29 0 .77 
SVM 80 .23 0 .8 
Style J48 77 .51 0 .75 
SVM 72 .41 0 .69 
250 features J48 95 .06 0 .95 
SVM 90 .69 0 .9 
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s  s at least one classiﬁer with an accuracy greater than 96% and the
rea under the ROC curve greater than 0.9. 
We observe that the style feature set is less discriminative,
.g., the area under the ROC curve obtained by the best classiﬁer
rained with the style feature set is the lowest among all classiﬁers.
his can be explained by the fact that the style features provide a
haracterisation of the style of the different persons but are not
eneral enough to detect the common features that characterise
he existence of salient group identities. 
.2.2. Are these results generalizable to detection of identity salience 
or unknown group identities and on different online social media? 
Facebook generalization . In this experiment we aim to determine
hether the previous results are generalizable to detect salience
f unknown group identities. To this aim, we tested the classiﬁers
ith a different dataset extracted from Facebook. Speciﬁcally, we
sed the conversations collected during the ﬁrst collection period
rom the Facebook pages of Beyoncé and Lady Gaga as examples
f conversations where there are salient group identities. We used
he conversations collected during the ﬁrst collection period from
he Facebook page of MTV as examples of conversations where
here is no apparent salient group identity. Thus, we are evaluating
f the classiﬁers are able to detect the salience of group identities
hat belong to different domains (i.e., the training set contains con-
ersations about politics, sports, news, videos, whereas the test set
ontains conversations about music and TV). 
Table 8 shows the results obtained. In general the accuracies of
ll classiﬁers are lower than in the previous experiment. Therefore,
n order to determine which speciﬁc features are most suitable for
etecting identity salience, we analysed the information gain ( Kent,
983 ) of features. The Information gain (IG) is frequently used in
achine learning to deﬁne a preferred sequence of features to be
sed by a decision tree (such as the J48 classiﬁer). Usually a fea-
ure with high IG should be preferred to other features. We cal-
ulated the IG of each feature for detecting identity salience and
rained our J48 and SVM classiﬁers with the top 250 features by
G. This represents less than 40% of all 651 features arising from
he union of all our feature sets. We used the same training data
et as in Section 4.2.1 and tested the classiﬁers for detecting iden-
ity salience or otherwise using conversations from the pages of
eyoncé, Lady Gaga and MTV. 
As can be seen in Table 8 , the classiﬁer trained with the most
elevant features performs very well in this generalization in terms
f accuracy and the area under the ROC curve. Speciﬁcally, it out-
erforms all classiﬁers trained with one feature set (i.e., an area
nder the ROC curve of 0.94 is obtained with the SVM classiﬁer).
ig. 2 shows the ROC curves obtained by this classiﬁer. This indi-
ates that a combination of the high IG features from the various
eature sets allows the most generalizable classiﬁer to be trained.
herefore, we can conclude that, by using a combination of fea-ures, it is possible to automatically detect the salience of unknown
roup identities within the same online media (as used for training
he classiﬁers) with a high degree of accuracy. 
Twitter Generalization . In this experiment we analyse if our anal-
sis model is generalizable to detect identity salience on a different
nline media. We used the conversations contained in the Totten-
amRiots set, in the Barack Obama and in the Justin Bieber proﬁles
s examples of conversations where there are salient group iden-
ities; and conversations in the TottenhamPreRiots set and the MTV
roﬁle, as examples of conversations where there is not a salient
roup identity. Again, we employed leave-one-out cross-validation.
Table 9 shows the results obtained by the detection classiﬁers
n this experiment. If we compare these results against the results
f the Facebook detection experiment (described in Section 4.2.1 ),
e observe that the performance of all classiﬁers deteriorates
lightly in this experiment. This may be due to the fact that the
weet size is limited to 140 characters and fewer words are used
o analyse conversations and train classiﬁers. As a consequence, the
48 classiﬁer trained with the structural feature set (features not
ffected by the number of words in conversations) outperforms the
est of classiﬁers. Speciﬁcally, the J48 classiﬁer trained with the
tructural feature set obtains an accuracy of 94.73% and an area
nder the ROC curve of 0.96 — see Fig. 3 for the ROC curves ob-
ained this classiﬁer. This demonstrates that our analysis model is
eneralizable to detect identity salience on different online media
ith a high accuracy. We can also observe from the table that both
he J48 and SVM classiﬁers trained with the 250 most relevant fea-
ures have a high accuracy —90% or above with a high ROC area
 ≥ 0.9). 
As in the Facebook detection experiment (described in
ection 4.2.1 ), the style feature set is the less discriminative, i.e.,
he best classiﬁer trained with the style feature is just a fair clas-
iﬁer since the area under the ROC curve is lower than 0.8. This
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Fig. 3. ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem with the 
J48 classiﬁer and the structural feature set. 
Table 10 
Ten most relevant features for detecting identity salience. 
Feature Feature description IG 
Type 
Structural Av. Inﬂuence 0 .68 
Structural Messages 0 .48 
Semantic General And Abstract Terms 0 .37 
Semantic Measurement 0 .36 
Semantic Social Actions, States And Processes 0 .35 
Semantic Money generally 0 .34 
POS Base form of lexical verb (e.g., give) 0 .34 
Semantic Degree (i.e., intensiﬁer terms) 0 .34 
Semantic Quantities 0 .33 
Style Av. Typing 0 .32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Distinguishing group identities using different feature 
sets. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy (%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 95 .21 0 .98 
SVM 87 .86 0 .88 
POS J48 95 .85 0 .98 
SVM 98 .4 0 .98 
Semantic J48 98 .72 0 .99 
SVM 99 .68 1 .0 
Category J48 94 .57 0 .99 
SVM 98 .08 0 .99 
Style J48 91 .69 0 .97 
SVM 94 .57 0 .95 
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Fig. 4. ROC curves obtained for the identity identiﬁcation problem with the SVM 
classiﬁer trained with the semantic feature set. 
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9 Again, to dismiss overﬁtting problems we also repeated this experiment using 
cross-validation and we obtained very similar results. supports our hypothesis that style features are not general enough
to detect the common features of salient group identities. 
4.2.3. Which features are most suitable for detecting identity 
salience? 
Of the 250 most relevant features for detecting identity
salience, 3 are structural, 110 POS, 104 semantic, 30 categories and
3 style. However, when we inspect these features in more detail
we note that the IG of most individual features is not so substan-
tially high to indicate that those features individually are strong
indicators of identity salience. But our generalization experiments
show that collectively they provide a strong basis for predicting
identity salience. 
Table 10 shows the 10 most relevant features for detecting iden-
tity salience. Speciﬁcally, for each relevant feature, it presents its
type, description and IG value. We can observe that the IG values
are low, which means that, in general, the features are less dis-
criminative. Six of the ten most relevant features are semantic tags,
two of them are structural features while one each is from the POS
and style sets. This information is in line with the results achieved
by the classiﬁers trained with the different sets of features (i.e., the
three best classiﬁers in Section 4.2.1 are trained with the struc-
tural, POS and semantic feature sets). Speciﬁcally, the average IG
of structural features is noticeably higher than the average IG of
any other feature set. This explains the fact that the best classiﬁer
trained with the semantic feature set, which contains 6 of the 10
most relevant features, does not lead to better performance when
compared with the best classiﬁer trained with the structural fea-
ture set. 
We can also observe that the two most relevant features are
the structural features. This is explained by the fact that structural
features allow to detect interaction patterns that characterise all
group identities. For instance, it is possible that users who share a
group identity are more prone to like comments that invoke thisdentity. However, detecting identity salience using structural fea-
ures only may lead to poor results when detecting incipient group
dentities; such incipient group identities may have little inﬂuence.
urthermore, the structural feature of “average inﬂuence” has a
igh IG which reﬂects identity theorists’ view of a cause-effect re-
ationship, whereby the salience of a social identity inﬂuences col-
ective action. 
.3. Distinguishing between group identities 
.3.1. Is it possible to distinguish between different group identities? 
Having determined that it is possible to detect the salience or
ack thereof group identities in online conversations, we focus on
he question of whether it is possible to distinguish between dif-
erent group identities. Thus, in this case the class of each conver-
ation is its group identity (i.e., Facebook page from which each
onversation has been extracted). To answer our research question
e used the conversations collected during the ﬁrst collection pe-
iod from the Facebook pages of Anonymous, Barack Obama, Lady
aga and Manchester United to train identiﬁcation classiﬁers . 
From the results in Table 11 , we can determine that it is possi-
le to distinguish between group identities with a high degree of
ccuracy —an accuracy of 99.68% is obtained with the SVM clas-
iﬁer and the semantic feature set. Fig. 4 shows the ROC curves
btained by this classiﬁer 9 . However, all feature sets allow group
dentities to be predicted with a high conﬁdence (i.e., for all fea-
ure sets there is at least one classiﬁer that obtains an area under
he ROC curve greater than 0.9). We next analyse if these results
re generalizable. 
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Table 12 
Distinguishing group identities: Time generalization. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy (%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 34 .55 0 .54 
SVM 78 .18 0 .62 
POS J48 72 .73 0 .75 
SVM 83 .64 0 .86 
Semantic J48 12 .73 0 .5 
SVM 60 .0 0 .7 
Category J48 45 .45 0 .52 
SVM 49 .09 0 .67 
Style J48 50 .91 0 .57 
SVM 69 .09 0 .6 
250 Features J48 80 .0 0 .74 
SVM 76 .36 0 .82 
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Fig. 5. ROC curves obtained for the identity prediction problem when conversations 
from a different time period are used to test the SVM classiﬁer trained with the 
most relevant feature set. 
Table 13 
Distinguishing group identities: Twitter generalization. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy (%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 80 .69 0 .87 
SVM 71 .37 0 .74 
POS J48 75 .74 0 .79 
SVM 77 .64 0 .77 
Semantic J48 77 .39 0 .77 
SVM 82 .84 0 .86 
Category J48 72 .85 0 .72 
SVM 75 .33 0 .73 
Style J48 72 .44 0 .39 
SVM 70 .71 0 .65 
250 features J48 82 .92 0 .82 
SVM 87 .62 0 .89 
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a  .3.2. Are these results generalizable to distinguishing group 
dentities over time and on different online social media? 
Time generalization . We analyse whether the results in
ection 4.3.1 can be generalized to distinguishing between group
dentities over time. It is obvious that classiﬁers can only classify
nstances into those classes that belong to the training set. This en-
ails that we cannot use the classiﬁers to predict other group iden-
ities not included in the training set. Because of this, we can only
etermine if the results obtained in the above analysis, can be gen-
ralized to conversations invoking the same group identities over
 different period of time. Note that the groups may evolve over
ime; e.g., the issues that are of interest to a group may change
hroughout time, but the collective sense of belonging to a speciﬁc
roup (i.e., the group identity) remains. 
We test the accuracy of our previously trained classiﬁers,
rained with the conversations collected during the ﬁrst collec-
ion period from the Facebook pages of Anonymous, Barack Obama,
ady Gaga and Manchester United to distinguish between group
dentities in the conversations collected during the second collec-
ion period from the same pages. Thus, we are evaluating if the
lassiﬁers are able to predict the same group identities (i.e., being
 supporter or opponent of Anonymous, Barack Obama, Lady Gaga
r Manchester United) when they are invoked more than one year
ater. Similar to identity salience detection, we also determine the
G of all the features in the union of our feature sets and use the
op 250 features to train J48 and SVM identiﬁcation classiﬁers. 
As we can observe from Table 12 , the accuracy and the area
nder the ROC curve for all classiﬁers based on individual fea-
ure sets decrease. This is explained by the fact that these groups
ave evolved in terms of content (e.g., the main topics discussed
n conversations), style (e.g., the number of words per message)
nd structure (e.g., number of users per conversation). For ex-
mple, the inﬂuence and importance of Barack Obama’s Facebook
age increased noticeably between the two collection periods (see
able 1 ). As a result, it is possible that the number of users in-
eracting in the page, the number of likes received per each mes-
age and the activity of these users changed drastically. These dif-
erences make it more challenging to predict group identities over
ime. 
Despite these changes, we can observe that group identities can
e identiﬁed with a high accuracy by the classiﬁer trained with
he POS feature set —an accuracy of 83.64% and an area under
he ROC curve of 0.86 is obtained with the SVM classiﬁer and
he POS feature set. This entails that despite the passing of time,
here are syntactic characteristics of each group identity that re-
ain unaltered. We also observe that the classiﬁers trained with
he 250 most relevant features perform better than those classi-
ers trained with individual feature sets (except the POS feature
et). This shows that it is possible to use a combination of fea-
ures to automatically predict and distinguish group identities overime with a high degree of accuracy —an accuracy of 82.92% is ob-
ained with the SVM classiﬁer and the most relevant feature set
ith substantial conﬁdence in the prediction (i.e., the ROC area is
.82). Fig. 5 shows the ROC curves obtained by the SVM classiﬁer
nd the 250 most relevant features. 
Twitter generalization . We evaluate the extent to which our anal-
sis can be generalized to identify group identities on different on-
ine media. To this end, we trained identiﬁcation classiﬁers with the
onversations contained in the TottenhamRiots and LondonRiots sets
nd the Twitter proﬁles of Barack Obama, Lady Gaga, Manchester
nited and Anonymous. Again, we employed leave-one-out cross-
alidation to assess each classiﬁer and feature set. 
Table 13 shows the results obtained. If we compare these re-
ults against the results of the Facebook identiﬁcation experiment
described in Section 4.3.1 ), we observe that the performance of all
lassiﬁers deteriorates slightly in this experiment. Again, this may
e explained by the tweet size limitation. Besides that, we have
sed conversations invoking similar group identities (i.e., group
dentities that correspond to different protest groups), which may
e more diﬃcult to distinguish from one another. Despite these
imilarities, group identities can be identiﬁed with high precision
i.e., there are classiﬁers that obtain areas under the ROC curve
reater than 0.8). We observe that the classiﬁers trained with
he 250 most relevant features perform better overall than those
rained with individual feature sets. This shows that that our anal-
sis model is generalizable to identify group identities on differ-
nt online media with a high degree of accuracy – an accuracy of
7.62% is obtained with the SVM classiﬁer and the most relevant
eature set with substantial conﬁdence in the predictions (i.e., the
OC area is 0.89). Fig. 6 shows the ROC curves obtained by the
VM classiﬁer and the 250 most relevant features. 
The classiﬁers trained with the style features obtain the lowest
ccuracies and ROC areas. This result conﬁrms that style features
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Fig. 6. ROC curves obtained for the identity prediction problem with the SVM clas- 
siﬁer trained with the 250 most relevant features. 
Table 14 
Ten most relevant features for distinguishing group identities. 
Feature Feature description IG 
Type 
POS Singular letter of the alphabet (e.g., a) 0 .96 
POS Formula 0 .92 
Style Av. Message Length (Chars) 0 .92 
Semantic Power relationship 0 .91 
Semantic General And Abstract Terms 0 .9 
Category Sports 0 .89 
Style Av. Message Length (Words) 0 .88 
Semantic Measurement 0 .87 
Category Crime 0 .87 
Semantic Social Actions, States And Processes 0 .86 
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10 According to our experiments, these topics are key features underpinning group 
identities. provide a characterisation of the individual styles and are not gen-
eral enough to distinguish the common features that characterise
each group identity. 
4.3.3. Which features enable a speciﬁc group identity to be 
accurately predicted? 
Of the 250 features used to train the classiﬁers in Tables 12 and
13 , 101 are semantic features, 106 POS, 35 categories, 5 style and 3
are structural features. This may lead one to conclude that seman-
tic and POS features are the most necessary to characterise a group
identity. However, when we study the IG of the top 10 features for
predicting group identities (see Table 14 ), we observe that this is
not necessarily the case. As illustrated by this table, 4 of the 10
most relevant features are semantic tags, 2 are style metrics, 2 are
categories and 2 are POS tags; and all have very high IGs. 
Interestingly, two style features show high IG, yet the best clas-
siﬁer trained with the style feature set is less accurate when com-
pared with the best classiﬁers trained with the other feature sets.
This is explained by the fact that the two high IG style features
provide the same information (i.e., the more words in a message,
the more characters it has) and their “addition” does not provide
more information. 
5. Discussion 
Our results validate our hypothesis that group identities affect
the way in which people communicate online and that it is possi-
ble to deﬁne a model that automatically analyses group identities
using features extracted from text-based online communications.
We now discuss some of the key insights and their potential im-
plications. 
Group identity manifests in semantic features . When distinguish-
ing between group identities in Facebook (cf. Table 14 ), it is
not surprising to note the presence of categories such as Crime
and Sports —these are evocative topics and have been shown toave a causal connection with social identity formation ( Levine &
rowther, 2008 ). The more interesting data is the presence of se-
antic features: General and Abstract Terms , which pertain to lan-
uage use with regards to action/inaction in general, and Social
ctions, States and Processes , which cover language use involving
eciprocity, participation, friendliness and approachability. Interest-
ngly these features also appear in the ten most relevant features
or identity salience detection in Table 10 (albeit with a signiﬁ-
antly lower IG). This reﬂects that formative processes for social
dentity manifest themselves in the semantics of the group con-
ersations and can act as potential indicators for the emergence of
ocial identities in online groups. 
We also note the presence of the Power Relationship se-
antic feature in Table 14 . This feature covers terms depicting
ower/authority/inﬂuence and organisation/administration. Also
oteworthy are: the structural indicator of average inﬂuence and
emantic indicator of intensiﬁer terms (depicted by the Degree se-
antic tag) for identity salience in Table 10 . Together, these point
o a potential link between such features and social identity and
roup mobilisation. All these features merit further investigation. 
Impact of the type and nature of social media . Our attempts at
eneralizing our analysis show reasonably high degrees of accu-
acy. However, they also indicate that the very nature of the social
etwork and that of the data it carries has an effect. In particular,
ur generalization experiments show that there is not a single fea-
ure set that is able to produce satisfactory results in Facebook and
witter. This may be attributed to the limits on message size in
witter or how identity is implicitly expressed on different social
edia owing to the different features they afford to users ( Conover
t al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2008 ) and how these features may lead
o various “in-group” and “out-group” formulations. However, the
50 most relevant features have been able to predict group iden-
ities with high accuracies across different social media. It would
e interesting to study how other types of social media impact the
ccuracy of such a predictive approach and whether a hybrid fea-
ure set drawing upon training data from a range of online social
edia can provide a basis for accurately detecting incipient group
dentities. 
The ethics of it all . The possibility of automatically predicting
roup identities poses a broad range of challenging ethical ques-
ions. For example, the features analysed in our study may be used
or monitoring the evolution of group identities over time. This
ay permit the identiﬁcation of different steps involved in the
onsolidation of social identities online. In turn, it may be possi-
le to identify actions (e.g., shifts in behaviour) that reliably im-
act on a group’s subsequent behaviour. By “seeding” speciﬁc se-
antic or structural features in text-based communications it may
e possible to make speciﬁc identities salient and hence “nudge”
he group’s behaviour towards a speciﬁc outcome. On the one
and, democratic movements such as the Arab Spring could be
romoted; e.g., by creating messages with an strong emphasis on
eciprocity, participation, friendliness and approachability. 10 On the
ther hand, however, so could be violent actions such as the Eng-
and Riots. These questions are highly pertinent given recent high
roﬁle news of mass surveillance activities such as Prism and the
nowden leaks. 
We have implemented the Identi-scope tool that can enable ex-
loration of these challenges. Furthermore, groups can utilise the
ool to study if their conversations are being systematically nudged
owards particular action or inaction through manipulation of the
eatures we have identiﬁed. 
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B  Limitations of our analysis . Our evaluation and results are based
n data collected from Facebook and Twitter. As we note above,
he nature of the social network and the purpose for which it is
sed by the various parties involved can inﬂuence the way social
dentities manifest themselves. Data from other social networks,
specially those that cater for speciﬁc demographics, e.g., young
eople, or particular group aﬃliations (political, religious, etc.) may
ield different results. One may conjecture that social networks
hat are aimed at particular group aﬃliations are likely to yield
ore accurate prediction of group identities. At the same time,
here may be more ﬁne-grained social identities at play (com-
ared to the coarse-grained group identities in our study) in these
ocial networks. Further experimentation is needed to determine
hether the automated analysis presented in this paper will yield
igh accuracies for such ﬁne-grained social identities. 
Our model predicts those group identities that are sustained by
nline interactions. Notwithstanding the role of oﬄine interactions
n social identity formation and processes, our model only consid-
rs the information that is publicly available in online social media
o predict group identities. The creation of a hybrid model capable
f considering both online and oﬄine interactions when predicting
ocial identities is left as future work. 
Model feasibility . The proposed analytical model and the Identi-
cope tool make extensive usage of different APIs provided by third
arties. In particular, both the Facebook Graph API 11 and the Twit-
er public API 12 are used to collect the conversations to be used
y the analytical model. Note these two APIs impose rate call lim-
ts to non-paying users. Similarly, our model and tool also make
se of the Relative Insight’s Interaction Analysis Engine 13 for NLP
asks, which is also accessed via its API over the Internet. Thus,
he time need to analyse messages may be affected by network
atency, congestion etc. However, these APIs process a reasonable
mount of requests in a short period of time (e.g., the Facebook
PI allows us to collect information about 10 0 0 messages in less
han 6 seconds). Finally, we would like to mention that, for those
omains where the volume and speed at which data is produced
akes it necessary to reduce the time needed for processing, solu-
ions such as parallelisation of the analysis, usage of paid APIs, etc.
an be applied. 
Model vulnerabilities . Our experiments demonstrate that our
odel is robust to predict group identities even if there are mes-
ages that invoke outlier identities (i.e., we have not performed
ny preprocessing on conversations to ﬁlter out outlier messages).
owever, this robustness may not hold when evasion techniques
re used to mask group identities. For example, Islamic State sup-
orters could try to misdirect group identity detection by injecting
nto their conversations messages in which a fake identity is in-
oked. Even more, automated approaches could be envisioned so
hat a single entity (whether individual or organisation) controls a
arge number of fake accounts to launch such evasive attacks. How-
ver, these threats can be mitigated using existing sybil defences
 Alvisi, Clement, Epasto, Lattanzi, & Panconesi, 2013; Fong, 2011 ),
lassiﬁcation techniques ( Thomas, McCoy, Grier, Kolcz, & Paxson,
013 ), and stylometry techniques ( Afroz, Islam, Stolerman, Green-
tadt, & McCoy, 2014; Brennan, Afroz, & Greenstadt, 2012; Ding,
ung, & Debbabi, 2015 ) to discard fake accounts and messages. The
peciﬁc mitigation techniques to be applied in a given situation
ay depend not only on the evasion techniques used by attackers
ut also on the nature of the social media 14 . 11 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api 
12 https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public 
13 https://relativeinsight.com/ 
14 An study to generate speciﬁc mitigation strategies is beyond the scope of this 
aper. 
 
B  
C  
 . Conclusion 
The model and results presented in this paper provide a step-
ing stone towards understanding how group identities and their
alience manifest in text-based communications via online social
edia and the implications this holds regarding risk posed by ex-
ernal agents (government or otherwise) to inﬂuence collective ac-
ion/inaction mediated by online social media. Our results show
hat it is possible to use linguistic and structural features and
achine learning techniques to automatically distinguish between
peciﬁc group identities as well as detect when group identities
ay be salient. Such predictions are not just highly accurate within
 particular social networking platform but also show potential for
eneralization on different types of social networks. Particularly in-
ightful are our observations about speciﬁc semantic features of
he language used in conversations that indicate social processes
or group formulation at work. Our analysis also shows a potential
ink between group identities and mobilisation inherent in the lan-
uage of online groups. We also highlight the challenging ethical
uestions raised by the ability to detect and, potentially affect, so-
ial identities and their salience through analysis and manipulation
f language features. We have developed a tool that allows explo-
ation of social identities by individuals and groups so that they
ay develop resilience against outside agents attempting to inﬂu-
nce their actions through manipulation of the features we have
dentiﬁed. 
Our future work will focus on exploring speciﬁc research ques-
ions around the manifestation of particular types of semantic fea-
ures and the impact of the nature of the social network as well as
ommunication modes and processes on group identity analysis.
nly by gaining a deeper understanding of the features and com-
unication processes at play can we hope to unravel the various
thics and privacy questions raised by this paper. 
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